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Capital flows in Indonesia:  




Experience across many different countries indicates that international financial liberalisation 
not only offers benefits but also poses risks (McLean and Shrestha (2002)). Financial 
liberalisation will stimulate foreign capital inflows of benefit in stabilising consumption levels 
and funding productive investment. Foreign capital, and especially foreign direct investment, 
also facilitates transfer of technology and managerial knowledge. Portfolio investment and 
offshore borrowing can contribute to the growth of the domestic financial market. Studies 
have found that, provided there is legal certainty, capital inflows can improve macroeconomic 
policy discipline (Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995)).  
Besides the benefits, financial liberalisation also involves risks. Capital inflows can put 
upward pressure on the recipient country’s currency, which will in turn adversely affect the 
trade balance. High-volume capital inflows can lead to rapid consumption growth, triggering a 
rise in inflation and the likelihood of a persistent current account deficit. Liberalisation of 
capital flows in a country with an inadequately developed financial system can render that 
country more vulnerable to crisis. For instance, credit expansion funded by foreign capital 
can put pressure on bank balance sheets in the event of exchange rate turmoil, exacerbating 
the fragility of the financial system (Calvo et al (1993)).  
The past few years have seen intensified debates on the advantages of liberalising capital 
flows, particularly since the round of balance of payments crises among developing countries 
during the 1990s. The financial and economic crises in Mexico and Asia, and of course the 
1997–98 crisis in Indonesia, demonstrate that even a country with high economic growth and 
sound macroeconomic policies still faces the risk of rapid capital outflows. This paper 
describes Indonesia’s experience in managing capital flows before, during and after the 
nation’s economic crisis.  
2. Development  and  impact of capital flows  
2.1  Development of capital flows 
Over the last three decades, in line with a greater degree of economic openness, the 
Indonesian economy has expanded impressively. Against this propitious backdrop, average 
annual economic growth from 1981 to 2007 reached 5.5%. This growth rate, however, falls 
below growth during the pre-crisis period, which averaged 6.7%. Improved macroeconomic 
stability was also evidenced by relatively controlled inflation, except during the crisis in   
1997–98 and in 2005 due to the reduction in fuel subsidies. Meanwhile, several external 
sector indicators demonstrated similar tendencies, such as: growth of the current account, 
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which ran a surplus during the last decade; the debt service ratio, which dropped below 20%; 
the threefold increase in international reserves over the past decade; and the competitive 
real exchange rate. 
Satisfactory external sector performance is evident from the agreeable developments in 
Indonesia’s balance of payments structure over the past decade. Principally from 1998, the 
current account began to run a surplus, while the capital and financial account experienced 
excessive outflows during the economic crisis. The positive trends that supported the overall 
balance surplus continued up to 2007. This success was partially attributable to the 
government’s role in actively supporting non-oil/gas exports by promulgating several 
conducive policies, but also due in part to the soaring global oil price that quickly boosted 
foreign exchange revenues stemming from the oil sector.  
Indeed, the financial account in Indonesia has not always generated a surplus. From 1980 to 
1996, the financial account ran a surplus, with an average of USD 4,886 million per year. 
However, from 1997 until 2003, the financial account recorded an average annual deficit of 
USD 5,017 million. There are many causal factors for this. First, waning government capital 
inflows, primarily due to less foreign grants for projects, both bilateral and multilateral. For 
instance in 2000, grants from the ADB, the IBRD and Japan fell 59% to USD 1.6 billion. In 
addition, food assistance decreased by 73% to a value of USD  73 million, which further 
exacerbated the shrinking government net capital inflow surplus.  
Graph 1 
Net capital flows 
In millions of US dollars 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia. 
Second, ebbing private capital inflows, mainly due to the increased servicing of private 
foreign debt (outflows), typically from the banking sector. This included capital outflow with its 
apogee during the economic crisis period of 1997–98, which compounded the deficit of 
private capital flows (Graph 1). 
The capital flows phenomenon has thus become an important issue requiring further 
observation, especially in the context of and given the relevance of government endeavours 
to promote sustainable economic activities. In terms of the players, up to the early 1980s, 
capital inflows to Indonesia were dominated by government capital because at that time the 
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financial market was underdeveloped, so did not attract the domestic private sector or foreign 
private sector to participate. In 1990, as a result of the financial reform programme and 
supported by the expanding role of the private sector in the economy, private capital began 
to dominate capital flows to Indonesia. Noteworthy growth has been reported over the last six 
years since the crisis, with a significant upsurge in net private capital flows (eg portfolio 
investment, foreign debt) being recorded, peaking at USD 8,247 million in 2007. Meanwhile, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) recommenced in 2004 after a downturn during the 1997–98 
economic crisis (Graph 2).  
Graph 2 
Composition of net capital flows 
In millions of US dollars 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia. 
On the inflow side, the dominance of other investment inflows (external debt, loan 
repayment, etc, from both the private and the public sector) in the 1990s was somewhat 
eroded by FDI and portfolio investment flows after 2005 (Graph 3). Post-crisis portfolio 
investment inflow was initially recorded in 2002. Although FDI inflows started to grow in 2004 
and remained more or less on a positive trend, capital inflows are still dominated by portfolio 
(and other) investment flows. Meanwhile, gross capital outflows seemed to be improperly 
recorded until 2004. In this regard, as shown in Graph 4, capital outflows were mainly 
attributed to transactions in other investment assets (records of external debt transactions 
from the corporate and banking sectors). Sharp deficits in other investment assets in 2005 
(USD  10.4 billion) were due to increased asset holdings (currency and deposits) by the 
private sector in foreign countries, particularly in the second and third quarters of 2005. 
Similar movements have been recorded recently, in July–August 2007, with other private 
sector investment assets increasing from USD  486 million (end-September 2006) to 
USD  2.6  billion (end-September 2007). An increase in other investment assets has been 
detected from increased deposits in foreign countries by domestic banks (banks’ 
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Composition of gross capital inflows 
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Source: Bank Indonesia. 
Graph 4 
Composition of gross capital outflows 
In millions of US dollars 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia. 
2.2   Capital flows: drivers and impact on the economy 
Drivers of capital flows 
The brisk rate of capital inflows, especially during the pre-crisis period, was, on the one hand, 
driven by the pressing need for development funds and, on the other, encouraged by 
financial liberalisation. Domestic saving, which ordinarily should be the main source of 
development financing, was inadequate for the scale of investment needed. Realising the 
importance of domestic as well as foreign financing, the government moved forward with 
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reform for improvement of capital flows was the launching of the free foreign exchange 
regime in 1970, under which anyone in Indonesia could hold, buy and sell foreign exchange. 
In a subsequent reform in 1982, exporters were allowed to hold foreign exchange from their 
export earnings as needed. In 1983 and 1988, the government launched ambitious 
deregulation policies for the banking system and the capital market. In June 1983, the 
government eliminated ceilings on credit allocations and interest rates. The October 1988 
banking deregulation led to a rapid expansion in banking networks and activities, including 
the opening of foreign banks and expansion of foreign bank branch operations. Bank 
ownership was liberalised in 1989 with foreign investors permitted to own up to 99% of bank 
shares listed on the capital market. Bank Indonesia also replaced offshore borrowing ceilings 
for banks with a new requirement on the net open position. In the real sector, new sectors 
were opened to foreign investment in 1991.  
Other internal factors attracting foreign capital to Indonesia included stable macroeconomic 
conditions (reflected in relatively strong economic growth, low inflation and a stable 
exchange rate) and the high interest rate differential. On the external side, Indonesia’s capital 
inflows were encouraged by the downward trend in international interest rates at the 
beginning of 1990. At the same time, the recession in the United States, Japan and some 
European countries prompted investors to reallocate portfolios to emerging markets, 
including Indonesia. Another external factor was the rapid expansion in the number of 
investment institutions, such as mutual funds, that invested heavily in developing countries in 
pursuit of long-term profits and diversification of risks. 
Reflecting the inadequacy of domestic savings as the main source of development financing 
was the savings-investment (S-I) gap for the 1980–96 period, which averaged 2.5 to 3% of 
total GDP. During the 1998–99 economic crisis, Indonesia the S-I gap turned into a surplus, 
reflecting a significant drop in investment activities. In the recovery process of the post-crisis 
period, the steady improvement in the overall macro economy and sociopolitical condition 
has gradually reversed the picture, producing the highest momentum in 2001 with an S-I 
surplus of 4.2% of GDP. Nevertheless, it can be seen from Graph 5 that while saving and 
investment have steadily increased, the net borrowing (S-I) gap has fluctuated during the last 
five years. This confirms that the economic recovery process has been volatile and relatively 
vulnerable to subsequent shocks. 
Graph 5 
Savings-investment gap 
As a percentage of GDP 
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Impact of capital flows on the economy 
The positive impact of capital inflows on the Indonesian economy is reflected in 
macroeconomic indicators during the pre-crisis period (Table 1). Between 1989 and 1996, 
Indonesia enjoyed one of the highest growth rates in Asia. Growth during the period 
averaged 7.2% while inflation was relatively subdued at below 10%. Unemployment 
averaged 4.9%. Per capita GDP improved significantly, rising from USD  596 in 1990 to 
USD 1,155 in 1996. The high economic growth occurred alongside structural changes in the 
economy, which shifted away from the traditionally dominant role of agriculture towards 
heavier reliance on manufacturing as the engine of the economy.  
 
Table 1 
Pre-crisis macroeconomic performance in Indonesia  
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Internal stability         
Real GDP growth (in per cent)  9.0 8.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 8.1 7.8 
Agriculture  2.3 2.9 6.3 1.7 0.6 4.2 1.9 
Industry  13.2  11.8 8.2 9.8  11.1  10.2  10.4 
Services  7.6 9.3 6.8 7.5 7.2 7.9 7.6 
Percentage  of  GDP:         
Consumption  63.3 64.1 61.8 64.7 65.6 65.9 66.0 
National  savings  27.5 26.9 26.9 27.0 28.4 28.0 28.5 
Investment 30.1  29.9  29.0 28.3 30.3 31.3 32.1 
Inflation  (CPI)  9.5 9.5 4.9 9.8 9.2 8.6 6.5 
Fiscal  balance  0.4  0.4 –0.4 –0.6  0.1  0.8  0.2 
External stability         
Current account (percentage of 
GDP?)  –2.8 –3.7 –2.2 –1.6 –1.7 –3.7 –4.0 
Net capital flows (percentage of 
GDP?)  4.9 5.0 3.8 1.9 2.4 4.6 5.0 
Forex reserves (in import months)  4.7 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.0 4.4 5.1 
M2 ratio against forex reserves (in 
per cent)  514.0 505.7 497.4 557.1 602.9 657.4 633.3 
Total offshore borrowing (as a 
percentage of goods and services 
exports)  222.0 236.9 221.8 211.9 195.8 205.0 194.0 
Short-term offshore borrowing (as 
a percentage of goods and 
services exports)  15.9  17.9 20.5 20.1 17.1 20.9 24.8 
Debt service ratio (as a percentage 
of goods and services exports)  30.9 32.0 31.6 33.8 30.0 33.7 33.0 
Exports (as a percentage of GDP)  26.6 27.4 29.4 25.9 26.0 26.0 26.2 
Export growth (in per cent)  15.9 13.5 16.6  8.4  8.8 13.4  9.7 
Oil prices (USD per barrel)  28.6 20.1 18.7 14.1 16.1 18.0 22.8 
Source: Bank Indonesia. 
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The brisk growth rate and massive capital inflows also resulted in steady expansion in 
Indonesia’s international reserves (gross foreign assets). After relative stability in the range 
of USD  2.5 billion to USD  5.6 billion during the period from 1980 to 1990, international 
reserves mounted steadily to USD 17.8 billion in 1996. Domestic interest rates maintained a 
declining trend in keeping with the flush liquidity on the market. However, because of the 
pressing need for foreign capital, the government maintained an interest rate differential to 
ensure that domestic interest rates would be competitive against foreign interest rates. In real 
terms, domestic interest rates remained positive as a result of the downward trend in 
inflation. 
Although financial sector deregulation offered numerous benefits, it was not supported by an 
adequate regulatory and supervision framework, nor by the institutional framework needed to 
promote financial system efficiency. With inadequate regulation and supervision, poor 
governance and heavy government intervention in credit allocations, the financial system 
was left weak and vulnerable. At the micro level, banks and corporate actors frequently 
ignored prudential principles. Offshore borrowings, in particular, were fraught with currency 
and maturity mismatches. Feeling secure given Indonesia’s track record of a stable rupiah 
during the period, the private sector neglected to hedge their offshore borrowings. When the 
exchange rate plunged into turmoil, the lack of hedging left these borrowers in a highly 
exposed position.  
Heavy capital inflows helped to keep the rupiah at the lower limit of Bank Indonesia’s 
intervention band. Measured in real terms, the rupiah in fact gained in value, with especially 
strong appreciation recorded during 1996 and the first half of 1997. In order to discourage 
market speculation and reduce the costs of intervention, Bank Indonesia gradually widened 
the intervention band. The strengthening rupiah hurt Indonesia’s competitiveness and 
created distortion in savings and investment decisions, thus reducing economic efficiency at 
the macro level.  
Increased capital inflows led to expansion in the money supply, which in turn fuelled 
aggregate demand at levels exceeding the absorption capacity of productive sectors. During 
the 1990–96, the narrow measure of the money supply (M1) and broad money (M2) widened 
by an average of 26.9% and 20% respectively. This quickly led to overheating in the 
Indonesian economy, particularly in 1995–96 when vigorous growth (close to 8%) was 
followed by high inflation (around 8.5%) and a hefty current account deficit (4% of GDP).  
In addition, a property boom funded by bank credit expansion and offshore borrowing led to 
an asset price bubble. Offshore borrowing by the government and private sector alike 
mounted to levels that by international standards would begin triggering alarm. Dominating 
the debt stock were private sector borrowings, which climbed sharply from USD 64 billion in 
1990 to USD 110.2 billion in 1996 (48.5% of GDP). The combination of these conditions left 
the economy vulnerable to domestic and international pressures. 
2.3   The economic crisis and its impact on the economy 
A prominent event related to Indonesian external developments was the economic crisis of 
1997–98. In July 1997, contagion from the balance of payments crisis in Korea and Thailand 
placed mounting pressure on the rupiah. With the domestic economy already fragile, the 
exchange rate turmoil quickly unfolded into a fully fledged financial and economic crisis. 
Externally, the exchange rate crisis triggered massive private capital flight with Indonesia’s 
balance of payments recording a deficit for the first time since 1989/90. The rupiah value of 
foreign debt and debt servicing obligations soared, causing many companies to default.  
Unlike with Thailand, few had suspected that Indonesia would suffer such a devastating 
crisis. Even the leading rating agencies failed to detect the country risk. Right until the eve of 
Indonesia’s crisis, markets were still indicating a fairly high level of confidence. The capital 
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adopted a free floating rate system in early July 1997. Shortly after that, however, 
expectations regarding Indonesia quickly reversed. Private capital that had previously poured 
into Indonesia suddenly began flowing out. Before the crisis, foreign investors had been 
perfectly willing to roll over short-term debt, such as commercial paper, certificates of deposit 
and promissory notes, but now all this had changed. Quickly, offshore sources of borrowing 
for the domestic private sector dried up while payments on outstanding debt were falling due. 
The capital account surplus that had reached USD 11 billion in 1996 plunged drastically to 
USD 2.5 billion in 1997. In 1998, the capital account sustained a USD 3.8 billion deficit that in 
1999 widened further to USD 4.6 billion. 
Despite the sharp rise in government capital inflows during the period, this was insufficient to 
cover the mounting deficit caused by outflows of private capital. Most of the official capital 
inflows comprised borrowing from creditor nations and international financial institutions 
under IMF coordination in support of the economic recovery programme. Indonesia’s 
post-crisis foreign debt composition thus changed significantly with a sharp rise in 
government debt in contrast to the decline in private sector borrowing.  
Graph 6 
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1  SBIs are Bank Indonesia Certificates issued since 1984 to manage the money supply. 
Source: Bank Indonesia. 
What started as a balance of payments crisis unfolded into a multidimensional crisis that 
brought down the economy as a whole. The rupiah quickly lost value amid wide fluctuations, 
falling from IDR 2,500 per US dollar in July 1997 to IDR 5,000 in December that year and to 
a low of IDR 16,000 (in Graph 6 less than IDR 14,000) per US dollar in June 1998. The 
economy contracted across all sectors, producing a sharp 13.7% real GDP decline in 1998 
(year on year). This was worsened by the failure of the export sector to take advantage of the 
rupiah’s depreciation because of inability to produce and the drying-up of financing. Domestic 
banks began to record negative margins, which resulted in a rapid contraction of the supply 
of domestic credit. In 1998, the sharp depreciation of the rupiah sent inflation soaring from 
11.6% in 1997 to 77.6%. Also contributing to the near hyperinflation was the sheer size of the 
money supply, and especially of cash outside banks. To curb inflation and stabilise the 
rupiah, Bank Indonesia applied an extremely tight monetary policy with steep increases in 
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After the worst of the crisis had passed and new policies had been introduced to put the 
economy back on track, signs of significant recovery began to emerge in 2002–03. Even so, 
conditions were far removed from the boom years before the crisis. The exchange rate 
recovered significantly to stabilise in the range of IDR 8,500 to IDR 9,000 to the US dollar in 
2003. Inflation fell sharply from 77.6% at the peak of the crisis (1998) to 5.06% in 2003. 
Likewise, interest rates came down from 38% (working capital credit) at the end of 1998 to 
13.4%. Although Indonesia’s recovery lagged behind that of other crisis-hit countries, 
economic growth nevertheless steadily improved to 4.72%.  
During this time, Indonesia also saw improvement in the balance of payments. The current 
account surplus during the most turbulent period of the crisis had resulted mainly from 
sharply reduced imports. In the years that followed, the surplus was maintained due to the 
strengthening performance of non-oil and gas exports. In 2003, the current account surplus 
reached USD 8.1 billion or 4.0% of GDP. With improved macroeconomic stability, private 
capital began flowing back into the country. During 2004–07, the capital account recorded an 
average surplus of USD 2.6 billion per year. Capital flows consisted mainly of rapidly 
expanding portfolio inflows and debt servicing by the private sector. As a result of the debt 
restructuring programme, private sector debt repayments were substantially lower than 
previously estimated. However, FDI remains low. The dominance of short-term funds in 
capital inflows calls for vigilance, as these flows are highly susceptible to changes in 
sentiment that can disrupt monetary stability.  
A valuable lesson from previous situations and the crisis itself is that financial sector 
liberalisation without adequate regulation, control and management (good governance) can 
cause fundamental weaknesses at the micro level. This is reflected in the following: 
(i)  Excessive dependence on foreign sources of funding. With heavy capital inflows, 
Indonesia’s private sector became increasingly dependent on external financing, 
particularly through debt. Before the crisis, private sector offshore borrowing had 
soared to nearly 60% of total foreign debt. At the same time, the managed floating 
exchange rate system in use before the crisis offered an implicit guarantee against 
exchange rate risk that encouraged the private sector to take out massive long-term 
loans without hedging. 
(ii)  Foreign debt mounted in the banking sector, with escalating risk from maturity and 
currency mismatch. To circumvent high domestic interest rates, Indonesia’s private 
sector sought funding alternatives from overseas offering lower interest rates. Many 
domestic banks borrowed short-term from foreign institutions to support their lending 
to the domestic private sector. These funds were then disbursed as long-term loans 
denominated in rupiahs. In 1993, foreign debt in the financial sector stood at 
USD 6 billion. By 1995, this had soared to USD 12.1 billion. 
(iii)  The financial condition of the banking system steadily weakened from mounting 
problem loans. Amid the rapid credit expansion, problem loans soared in the 
banking industry because of the high volume of lending that ignored prudential 
principles. In November 1996, loan losses in the banking system stood at 
IDR 10.4 trillion (about 2% of GDP or 10% of total lending), with 68% of these losses 
recorded at state banks.  
(iv)  Government intervention in credit selection. Lending decisions at state banks were 
strongly influenced by government intervention, with the result that many loans were 
extended by reason of political pressure or connections. Decisions concerning credit 
expansion were in many cases implicitly or explicitly directed by the government.  
(v)  Poor management (governance). Lack of bank financial transparency undermined 
not only the accuracy of financial analysis but also social control and market 
discipline. Unsound business management led to inefficiency and failure in the 
application of good management principles. Poor corporate governance was also 274  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
reflected in the lack of effective institutions, particularly for resolution of bankruptcy. 
This in turn created moral hazard in the business sector.  
3.   Management of capital flows  
The heavy social and economic costs of the financial crisis underscore the importance of 
efforts to reduce economic vulnerability to sudden reversals in capital inflows. Capital flows 
tend to follow a cycle, rushing in when the economy is strong and rushing back out again 
during times of decline. Developing countries are more susceptible to loss of investor 
confidence, with the result that the economic and social costs of a financial crisis can be 
enormous. So far, Indonesia has adopted a series of policies to mitigate negative impacts 
from capital flows on the economy. These policies focus on two key areas. First, the use of 
macroeconomic policy instruments to counter the negative impact of capital flows on 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate stability. Second, the control of short-term capital flows 
through a series of regulations on foreign borrowing, foreign exchange transactions and 
operations of the banking system. The appropriate policy mix depends on various factors, 
such as the causes of capital inflows and outflows (permanent or temporary), availability and 
flexibility of instruments and the condition of the domestic financial market.  
It is painfully obvious that policies put in place prior to the crisis were inadequate for building 
Indonesia’s economic resilience to the negative impact of capital volatility. This was 
demonstrated by Indonesia’s inability to cope with the contagion effect of the mid-1997 
currency crisis in Thailand. For this reason, the management of capital flows in the post-crisis 
period has been supported by efforts to improve the resilience of the domestic financial 
system through a series of structural reforms. Following this, policy focused on efforts to 
boost capital inflows through consolidation of macroeconomic stability and actions to reduce 
the risk of a reoccurrence of the crisis. In general, policy targeted the following four 
objectives: a sound macroeconomic framework consistent with the exchange rate regime; a 
sound domestic financial system with proper controls and prudential standards; an 
independent and strong central bank; and transparency through provision of up-to-date and 
accurate economic information. A number of elements have been important in achieving 
these goals: 
3.1 Monetary  policy 
Monetary policy plays an essential role in coping with demand pressure. During the managed 
floating rate regime, monetary policy focused on sterilisation of the monetary expansion 
caused by the accumulated foreign exchange reserves as a means of curbing demand 
pressure. Sterilisation took place primarily through open market operations using Bank 
Indonesia Certificates (SBIs), with the support of the statutory reserve requirement, discount 
window and moral suasion.  
In response to the excessive monetary growth in 1994 brought on by domestic credit 
expansion partly funded by offshore loans, monetary policy was tightened significantly in 
mid-1995. Monetary expansion was effectively reduced through forex market sterilisation. 
However, the monetary policy tightening resulted in higher domestic interest rates, 
particularly during the 1995–96 period. This occurred at a time of falling rates on dollar 
instruments, thus widening the interest differential. In turn, the wider differential provided 
added impetus to capital inflows. Because short-term capital flows were more responsive to 
changes in the interest differential and movement in the nominal exchange rate remained 
largely steady, a shift took place in the composition of external debt obligations. Historically, 
external obligations had consisted primarily of foreign investment and long-term borrowings, 
but now were dominated by portfolio flows and other short-term debts.  BIS Papers No 44  275
 
 
The new composition significantly increased the burden of monetary sterilisation through the 
use of open market operation instruments, and support from other monetary instruments 
became necessary. To reduce bank lending capacity, the statutory reserve requirement was 
raised from 3% in 1995 to 5% in 1997. Bank Indonesia in addition sought to limit credit 
expansion through moral suasion, calling on banks to submit their annual business plans and 
progress reports and establishing a credit policy direction. Bank Indonesia also introduced 
restrictions on lending to the property sector. 
During the crisis, the priority for monetary policy was to arrest the depreciation of the rupiah 
and rein in inflation by tightening the money supply. This was accomplished by absorbing 
excess liquidity and especially the enormous volume of base money that resulted from Bank 
Indonesia’s liquidity support extended to commercial banks to keep the banking system from 
collapse. In response, interest rates climbed sharply from 22% in January 1998 to a high of 
70% in September that year. Although several underlying factors played significant roles, it is 
believed that the monetary institutional establishment was the main aspect fostering 
economic stability, not only in the short run but also in the long run. During 2003, five years 
after the crisis, consistent monetary policies supported by prudent fiscal policies and other 
progress achieved in economic restructuring have contributed to macroeconomic and 
monetary stability. The inflation rate declined significantly to about 5% in 2003, from an 
average of 10% over the 2000–02 period. Consequently, these conditions provided adequate 
room for monetary policy to consistently adjust interest rates in order to support further 
economic recovery. 
To strengthen monetary policy effectiveness, the monetary authority introduced the Inflation 
Targeting Framework in July 2005 with an interest rate (the BI rate) as the operating target. 
Open market operations were also supported by direct intervention on the rupiah money 
market using rupiah intervention instruments.  
3.2  Exchange rate system 
In an open small economy like that of Indonesia, the management of the exchange rate plays 
a vital role.
2 Since 1967, Indonesia has employed three different exchange rate regimes 
(fixed, managed float and float). The periods of the fixed and managed floats alone were 
marked by eight devaluations – six of them during 1967–78. Prior to the 1997 currency crisis, 
the policy focus was on maintaining a real exchange rate conducive to export-oriented 
growth.  
In the early years of national development, Indonesia had relied on a currency peg. However, 
increasing capital mobility and growing integration into the regional and international 
economy led Bank Indonesia to consider a more market-oriented exchange rate mechanism. 
Thus in 1978, Indonesia abandoned the peg for the managed floating system.
3 Under this 
system, movement in the rupiah was managed by Bank Indonesia within an intervention 
band. The direction of the middle point of the intervention band was determined by Bank 
Indonesia, taking into account the real competitiveness of the rupiah against the real 
exchange rate movements of major trading partner currencies. Bank Indonesia would then 
                                                  
2   Transmission of exchange rate fluctuations is felt throughout the country through import prices which in turn 
are reflected in general prices through the price of finished goods produced with imported intermediate goods. 
Inflation in general prices determines the level of interest rates. Through the interaction of the money market 
and the goods market, this interest rate, adjusted for inflation, theoretically determines the output of the 
economy.  
3   In 1971–78, Indonesia had operated a fixed exchange rate with the rupiah pegged against the US dollar. This 
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only intervene on the foreign exchange market when the market exchange rate began 
moving outside the intervention band.  
As Indonesia’s economy opened further with the rising volume of capital inflows, the 
intervention band was progressively widened. From September 1992 to August 1997, Bank 
Indonesia widened the band eight times. Despite this, capital inflows, particularly of 
short-term capital, continued to mount rapidly. The reason was that the intervention band 
helped the market to predict movement in the nominal exchange rate, and this reduced the 
incentive for market agents to hedge their offshore debt exposure. Because of the heavy 
volume of capital inflows, the market exchange rate was almost always at the bottom limit of 
the intervention band (Graph 7). 
Graph 7 
Exchange rate movement and the intervention band 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia. 
The massive capital outflows during the crisis resulted in serious problems for 
macroeconomic management. The sudden movement of vast volumes of capital 
necessitated hugely expensive market intervention, reduced the effectiveness of monetary 
sterilisation and increased the quasi-fiscal costs of monetary policy operations. The first 
move to arrest the decline in the rupiah was the widening of the intervention band. However, 
pressure on the rupiah continued to mount. On 14 August 1997, the monetary authority 
abandoned the intervention band altogether and switched to a free-floating exchange rate 
system. This protected base money from fluctuations in capital flows, limited speculation and 
shifted the weight of the increased exchange rate risk onto foreign investors.
4  
                                                  
4    Since Indonesia moved from managed to free floating on 14 August 1997, intervention has been used 
primarily as a liquidity management tool to offset government expenditures. At the same time, such 
interventions can also stabilise rupiah volatility, especially during rapid depreciations associated with excess 
liquidity. Thus intervention, through tightening domestic liquidity by the sale of foreign exchange, can be used 
as a framework to influence the exchange rate. As well as absorbing excess rupiah liquidity, intervention by 
way of selling foreign currency also aims at lessening the volatility of the exchange rate, easing market 
pressures, and, by its nature, adding foreign currency liquidity to a market which is often marked by lack of 
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However, the sudden weakening of the rupiah against the US dollar during the 1997 crisis 
and the brief period right after it simply reflected the excess demand for the US dollar against 
the rupiah in the local market. Closer observation revealed that such excess demand did not 
necessarily represent any underlying real transaction of goods and services. Non-resident 
economic agents who held current accounts with Indonesian banks played a big role in such 
a phenomenon. In this context, part of the excess demand for US dollars can be categorised 
as “speculative trading”.  
Given the thin, small and immature IDR/USD exchange market during that time, such large 
speculative trading volumes had relatively major consequences for the economy. The 
IDR/USD exchange rate became a source of uncertainty, due to the nature of the 
speculation, which triggered volatility more than stability. Subsequently, it posed bigger 
problems for the economy because a large number of economic agents were facing the 
sudden reality of asymmetrical (limited) information regarding the future IDR/USD rate, thus 
influencing their economic decisions involving any exposure to exchange rate risk. In 
contrast, other players, mainly in the international financial markets, enjoyed relatively less 
risky decision-making in their business, due to their advantages in terms of access, prowess 
and knowledge of international finance issues. Right after the rupiah was freely floated 
against the US dollar, for instance, nobody could easily calculate its “equilibrium” rate. Only 
economic agents with an information advantage and sophistication were able to reap gains 
from IDR/USD trading during that time – mainly economic agents in the international financial 
market – and among the most influential players were non-residents.  
It is common practice for countries to try to limit speculative trading of their currency in the 
interest of safeguarding domestic price stability. Asian countries have been known to do so, 
including Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and China. How does Indonesia go about it? 
As briefly discussed above, right after it was allowed to float freely, the Indonesian rupiah 
became the subject of speculative trading; this occurred with relative ease due to the lack of 
regulation. The offshore rupiah market has been known to be very active, thus making the 
rupiah as an international “commodity” in the world market, which only mirrors the currency’s 
internationalisation. The ownership of rupiahs by non-residents can be motivated by a real 
underlying need to finance the goods and services traded or by profit-seeking through 
speculative trades, two areas which are not easily separated. While the use of the rupiah for 
underlying real transactions is desirable, its use for speculation is not, because the latter 
would introduce instability into the market if not isolated. Thus, the trading of rupiahs by 
non-residents in the offshore market does not benefit the economy because the main 
underlying need in this case is merely to speculate on the IDR/USD rate for profit.  
IDR/USD trading by non-residents involves spot and derivatives transactions. Spot market 
transactions take place conventionally with counterparties agreeing to each other’s bids and 
asks with the promise to deliver as arranged, while derivatives involve a higher degree of 
complexity. For example, derivatives often involve synthetic swaps, where a non-resident 
can speculate on the IDR/USD rate by buying rupiahs from the resident via the spot 
transaction (two-day or next day settlement), and at the same time buying back the US 
dollars in the forward market (for future delivery). By doing this, non-residents obtain the 
implicit rupiah credit facility (non-conventional) while locking their exchange rate risk through 
forward transactions.  
In order to curb such speculative action arising from the internationalisation of the rupiah, in 
1997 Bank Indonesia issued a regulation that limits forward trading to USD 5 million per 
transaction, although with only partial success due to the lack of enforcement and sanctions. 
Given all these problems, a well orchestrated policy is needed to really curb speculative 
trading, especially by limiting international speculators’ access to the rupiah, including rupiah 278  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
financing through sophisticated derivatives arrangements.
5 Fortunately, Bank Indonesia and 
the government of Indonesia have introduced the needed regulations, which have been 
relatively successful in reducing the threat of such speculation.
6 However, all of these 
abnormal market activities only took place during the period of upheaval, which is the only 
context in which speculative trading of this kind can reap big gains. Hence it must be stated 
that when the overall market situation has normalised and the impact of fluid political and 
other non-economic factor developments has lessened, the sizeable swap and derivatives 
market with its highly diverse maturity profile will be a catalyst for the future development of 
Indonesia’s modern financial sector.  
3.3  Regulation of offshore borrowing and efforts to improve transparency  
In October 1991, Indonesia reinstituted quantitative limits on offshore borrowing by banks 
and the government sector, including state-owned enterprises. A ceiling on private offshore 
borrowing was also imposed for activities directly connected with government institutions. 
The central bank set up a queuing system in which prospective borrowers would apply for 
licences within the ceiling. Penalties were imposed on banks that did not submit progress 
reports on their offshore borrowing and on borrowing in excess of the ceiling. The queuing 
system enabled the central bank to determine the amount of the debt drawdown and monitor 
the terms and conditions and use of borrowed funds. 
Following this, the government introduced quantity controls over private sector foreign 
borrowing in a regulation on issuance of commercial paper where banks acted as arrangers. 
Bank Indonesia also eliminated the subsidy for swap facilities in order to reduce incentives 
for drawdown of debts. The attempts to restrict private offshore borrowing lacked 
effectiveness because of the difficulty of controlling capital flows in a relatively free foreign 
exchange system. Complicating this was the lack of an accurate, thorough and timely 
reporting system. The central bank was unable to control capital flows and had difficulty in 
obtaining an accurate picture of private sector foreign borrowings. 
Lack of detailed, accurate and timely data on capital flows, especially short-term capital, is a 
key factor in the slow policy response to pressures generated by rapid capital flows. To 
resolve this, Bank Indonesia has developed a system for monitoring foreign exchange flows 
and strengthened transparency based on accurate reporting of economic and financial 
information as stipulated in Act no 24 of 1999 on Foreign Exchange Flows.  
3.4  Banking regulations on bank forex transactions and forex positions 
Bank Indonesia is engaged in an ongoing drive to strengthen bank performance and 
efficiency in order to build a sound banking industry resilient to internal and external shocks. 
Actions taken include improvements to the application of prudential principles, bank 
restructuring through mergers, resolution of problem loans, and rescue or closure of problem 
banks. The central bank also encourages banks to apply self-regulatory principles, improve 
the quality of risk management and enhance the quality of human resources.  
On other fronts, Bank Indonesia is working to bring the Indonesian banking system into line 
with the standards proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The capital 
                                                  
5   For example forward and/or swap selling, and put and call option transactions.  
6   Government Regulation no 18/1998 of 2 February 1998 limits the amount of rupiahs that may be physically 
transported into and out of Indonesia, while various Bank Indonesia circulars limit rupiah cash loans for 
exchange rate trading, as does Official Announcement by the Exchange Rate Department to Banks 
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adequacy ratio was raised to 8% at all banks in 1995–96. The loan/deposit ratio is restricted 
to a maximum of 110%, and banks must also operate under the legal lending limit.  
Restrictions also apply to bank asset positions and foreign exchange liabilities in the 
regulation on the net open position (NOP). In 1992, Bank Indonesia raised the NOP from 
20% to 25% of bank capital, with banks required to report their NOP regularly to the central 
bank. Initially, the NOP regulation applied only to on-balance sheet assets and foreign 
exchange components. This was subsequently amended to include off-balance sheet items. 
As important as these provisions were, they still proved inadequate in compensating for the 
weak internal management in the banking sector. Weak internal control and the unsupportive 
behaviour of bank owners and management concerning prudential principles led to rampant 
banking irregularities in areas ranging from credit valuation and classification to application of 
accounting standards. For example, banks competed with each other in lending to the 
property sector, where loans were partly funded through offshore borrowing and extended 
without proper credit valuation. This, in turn, led to burgeoning problem loans and became 
one of the factors that undermined the banking sector and ultimately brought on the banking 
crisis in Indonesia. 
To ease pressure on the rupiah, on 12 January 2001 Bank Indonesia issued Regulation 
no 3/3/2001 on Restrictions on Rupiah Transactions and Foreign Currency Loans by Banks. 
The regulation essentially covers two main areas: 
(i)  Prohibition of rupiah transfers by Indonesian banks to non-residents, with particular 
emphasis on rupiah transfers not supported by underlying transactions within the 
Indonesian economy. 
(ii)  Restriction on derivatives transactions not supported by underlying transactions, 
with the maximum limit for derivatives transactions involving forex sales by domestic 
banks to non-residents being lowered from USD 5 million to USD 3 million. 
This regulation is intended to limit the supply of rupiahs from residents to non-residents for 
potential use in speculative activities and thus curb excessive fluctuation in the rupiah. In 
addition to the policy restricting foreign exchange transactions, Bank Indonesia also 
amended the NOP regulation. In July 2004, the new NOP was introduced for two categories: 
(i) a 30% NOP on on-balance sheet components and the overall balance sheet for banks that 
include market risk in the calculation of their capital adequacy; and (ii)  a 20% NOP on 
on-balance sheet components and the overall balance sheet for banks not calculating market 
risk.
7  
3.5  Financial sector restructuring  
The primary goal of financial sector restructuring is to rebuild public confidence in the 
banking sector and, in so doing, create long-term financial system stability, improve 
efficiency in financial intermediation, and build financial system resilience for the medium and 
long term. The following are specific actions pursued to achieve these objectives: 
(i)  Rebuilding confidence in the banking sector by launching a blanket guarantee 
scheme guaranteeing bank deposits of all types, in both domestic and foreign 
currency. 
                                                  
7    See Bank Indonesia Regulation no 6/20/PBI/2004 of 15 July 2004 amending Bank Indonesia Regulation 
no 5/13/PBI/2003 on the Net Open Position for Commercial Banks. 280  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
(ii)  Improvements in banks’ internal governance: 
•  Strengthening of the legal framework, policies and infrastructure of the 
banking system. To this end, new laws on the banking system and the 
central bank came into force in October 1998 and May 1999.  
•  Strengthening of prudential regulations with focus on improving banks’ 
internal control, organisational structure, enforcement of banking 
regulations and a specific programme for building up the expertise of bank 
supervisors and examiners.  
(iii)  Rebuilding bank solvency: 
•  Establishment of the Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA) and 
the Asset Management Unit (AMU). 
•  Closing-down of problem banks. Following the crisis, 20 commercial banks 
had their licences revoked and four state banks were merged into a single 
entity named Bank Mandiri (September 1998). 
•  Strengthening of bank capital through the recapitalisation programme.  
3.6  Fiscal policy and other structural reforms  
Sound fiscal conditions are important for reducing the volatility of capital flows. To address 
this, the government strengthened fiscal prudence in two key steps. The first involved 
reducing the size of the foreign debt service burden by using the fiscal surplus and the 
proceeds raised from the privatisation of state-owned enterprises for early repayment of high 
interest foreign debt. Second came expenditure reductions in investment and consumption 
designed to ease government dependency on international borrowings. The government 
expenditure reductions were designed to protect major revenue-generating activities 
important for long-term growth. Because most government expenditures are used for 
non-tradable goods and services, this expenditure reduction policy would also help ease 
pressures for real appreciation of the exchange rate. Fiscal conditions were strengthened 
through increased taxation and improved management of state-owned enterprises. The 
conservative fiscal policy enabled the government to accumulate considerable savings 
deposited with the central bank that reduced the expansion of base money.  
With the crisis having severely weakened domestic demand, fiscal policy sought to promote 
economic recovery and lay the foundations for sustainable fiscal management. Four main 
objectives were established. The first was to provide a fiscal stimulus for the sectors and 
social group worst affected by the crisis. The second was to prepare for the creation of more 
agricultural resources in the medium term. The third was support for banking recapitalisation 
and restructuring. The fourth was management of the fiscal deficit using funding not 
originating from the central bank.  
Domestic revenues were strengthened through improvements to the tax structure and tax 
administration. Non-tax revenues were enhanced by transferring some hitherto off-budget 
items to budget revenues. To fund the budget deficit, the government continued to draw on 
foreign borrowings that accounted for as much as 60% of total budget funding. Other budget 
funds came from the proceeds of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and sales of 
bank assets held by IBRA. To provide added deficit financing, the government re-entered the 
international capital market in 2004 with a successful USD 1 billion bond issue that attested 
to improved credibility in the eyes of foreign investors.  
Structural reforms in the economy have been focused on addressing various problems that 
hamper the efficient functioning of the market mechanisms on the supply side. Adjustments 
are required to improve transparency in decision-making, foster a climate of fair competition 
and improve good governance through market-friendly policies. Measures taken to improve BIS Papers No 44  281
 
 
transparency and efficiency in the government sector include developing mechanisms for the 
resolution of tariff issues and business conflicts and improving mechanisms for the selection 
of government projects. Meanwhile, the critical steps towards fostering a conducive business 
climate are, inter alia, removing obstacles to foreign investment, lowering import tariffs and 
export taxes on various products, eliminating import subsidies, and removing import 
monopolies for basic commodities, price controls on certain products and restrictions on 
foreign share ownership of companies listed on the stock exchange. 
3.7  Developing robust capital markets  
In Indonesia, as in most of East Asia, the banking sector continues to be the major source of 
domestic financing. Capital markets are still embryonic, and on the few occasions when 
issues are priced, they are usually in small amounts. The inadequacies of East Asia’s capital 
markets represent the flipside of dominant banking sectors that have intermediated over 80% 
of the region’s investment. Banking sector dominance was even greater in Indonesia, and in 
the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis bank lending collapsed, further exacerbating 
domestic economic implosion. The collapse of bank lending after the crisis exposed the 
fragilities of both the country’s and the region’s financial systems in responding to external 
shocks due to unexpected capital reversals. To address weaknesses in the financial system, 
Indonesia has systematically adopted a practical step-by-step approach, based on 
collaboration among all government agencies, to creating an environment in which these 
economic, technical and political factors build confidence and lead to the robust development 
of capital markets. An equity market and a rudimentary bond market already exist in 
Indonesia; however, developing the bond market is now a primary focus. 
A primary stage of Bank Indonesia’s strategy involves establishing a comprehensive market 
for government bonds, which will eventually become the backbone of the corporate and other 
sectors of the bond market that are likely to emerge. The market for government bonds will 
help provide a benchmark yield curve and establish the overall credit curve off which all other 
issues will be priced. A deep and liquid market for government bonds not only fosters 
financial stability by allowing the development of other capital market sectors, but also 
provides the government with tools for effectively managing its debt, reducing dependence 
on foreign borrowing and supporting the implementation of sound and prudent monetary 
policy. 
4.  Capital flows and financial stability: recent salient observations  
As a consequence of increasing globalisation coupled with greater openness of the 
economy, Indonesia’s economic and financial institutions are undergoing changes. Key 
factors behind the changes are the macro policies adopted by the Indonesian government 
and the rapid progress in information technology. Another important factor is the growth in 
the number of financial institutions: by November 2007, Indonesia had 130 banks with 
9,667 branch offices, compared with 7,001 branch offices operating for 141 banks in 2002. In 
November 2007, funds mobilisation and credit reached IDR 114.84 trillion and 
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Source: Bank Indonesia. 
The capital market has also seen remarkable change. Listing on the Jakarta stock exchange 
(JSX) climbed from 331 companies in 2002 to 383 in December 2007, while market 
capitalisation also soared in the same period from IDR 268 trillion to IDR 1,988 trillion 
(Graph 9). Share trading rose from IDR 10.2 trillion in 2002 to IDR 89.2 trillion in 2007. This 
indicates that sources of business funding are diversifying away from the banking system. At 
the same time, the expanding portion of foreign investor holdings in the capital market 
reflects the growing integration of Indonesia’s money market and capital market into the 
global system. The ratios in value terms of foreign investor sales and purchases to total sales 
and purchases in the capital market are given in Graph 10. 
Graph 9 
Jakarta stock exchange market capitalisation 
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Sources: Bank Indonesia; CEIC. 
The flows of money and capital that occur in an open economy framework exceed the flows 
of goods in the real sector, and that poses specific challenges for the monetary authority in 
dealing with the internal balance in the economy. The main concern is that a more open 
economy reduces the degree of monetary policy effectiveness. Other important issues are 
the exchange rate policy choice, external debt management, and the primary balance in the 
fiscal budget. With a relatively open capital account, optimal exchange rate management is a 
high priority. Managing the macroeconomic impact of a relatively liberal capital account can 
mean less complex policy challenges when the “automatic adjustment” mechanism is 
applied, such as the implementation of the free floating exchange rate. However, several 
factors should be considered before an optimal exchange rate policy and strategy are 
chosen, as such a liberal approach to the floating exchange rate can be less beneficial to the 
economy if economic and financial institutions are not coping with the standard practices 
followed in the more globalised part of the world.  
In monetary policy, the dilemma always faced by the monetary authority in an open capital 
system concerns the blunted effectiveness of interest rates in lowering inflation and the 
consequences for the exchange rate. Openness allows for international economic influences 
to work directly in the day-to-day economic decision-making of economic agents. Any 
interest rate hike involving a strong world currency (US dollar or Singapore dollar, for 
example) will lower the interest rate differential, possibly triggering capital flight that will 
weaken the rupiah and enlarge the current account deficit. But if, for example, Bank 
Indonesia anticipates this by raising the SBI rate, to keep the rupiah at an attractive level and 
prevent capital flight, such a strategy will induce inflows of capital, appreciation of the 
nominal IDR/USD rate, and boost inflation through an increase in the money supply, putting 
pressure on the external sector balance. The excessively high interest rates will also dampen 
overall economic growth if not accompanied by improvements in productivity. Moreover, a 
growing capital market highly susceptible to rumours and movements in world markets – as 
attested by the close correlation between the JSX index and the NYSE and other indices – 
will create further difficulty for the use of monetary policy to combat inflation while 
maintaining a competitive exchange rate.  
Therefore, the inflows and outflows of money and capital are better reflected in the 
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inflows, bringing not only capital but also technology and market access, and without creating 
short-term liabilities. Meanwhile, obligations in the form of royalties or dividends normally 
arise after a company has started operating and earning profit. Portfolio investment is the 
logical consequence of capital market expansion, but it is obviously preferable to have 
inflows for equity investment. At the same time, it is becoming more difficult to raise 
long-term borrowings, which has led to the recent soaring trend in short-term private 
borrowing. Another important issue is the effectiveness of the government’s debt 
management strategy in avoiding a debt trap. In fact, in terms of total debt, there is a shift in 
the government role to the private sector.  
Using a simple exercise, we seek to establish how the inflows and outflows of foreign capital 
in the case of the Indonesian economy respond to the movement of interest rate differentials 
and the real effective exchange rate. Basically, we estimate the probability of “capital flow 
decreases” given changes in macroeconomic variables.
8 Our aim is to check whether the 
market shows an excessive tendency to flee Indonesia when the prime macroeconomic 
variables – that is, the real effective exchange rate (REER) and interest rate differentials, 
move. 
Graph 11 shows that the probability that “capital inflows (outflows) decrease” becomes 
smaller (bigger) with a higher interest rate differential. This just confirms the notion of “flight 
to higher gains” for foreign capital in a particular small open economy with free capital 
movements. However, it is encouraging that when the market sees interest rate differentials 
narrow, the probability of bigger foreign capital outflows remains below 0.50. That alone 
proves the confidence of the international economic agents who already hold positions in 
Indonesia and their willingness to stay. 
Graph 11 
Foreign capital flows (to and from Indonesia) 
and their response to movements in interest rate differentials, 
November 2003–June 2007 
 
                                                  
8   To capture the response of capital flows to some financial market signals, we use the probit model. This model 
is a regression model for a dependent variable that has a Bernoulli distribution, a discrete probability 
distribution. The series records 1 when gross capital flows decrease and 0 when gross capital flows increase 
or remain stable. We use interest rate differentials, REER and the nominal exchange rate as financial market 
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Meanwhile, Graph 12 shows that the probability that “capital inflows (outflows) decrease” in 
both cases becomes smaller with real effective exchange rate appreciation. REER 
appreciation is associated with a decrease in Indonesian economic competitiveness. 
However, real appreciation is conducive to foreign economic agents continuing investing in 
Indonesian short-term equity and fixed income portfolios. That relates to the future 
expectation of better returns in terms of their home currencies, which explains why foreign 
holdings in those two types of portfolio investments remain relatively high. Thus, we still see 
the probability of capital outflows below 0.50, which again shows how the international 
economic agents investing in Indonesia maintain their confidence to stay, vis à vis the 
appreciation of the REER. 
Graph 12 
Foreign capital flows (to and from Indonesia) 
and their response to REER, 
November 2003–June 2007 
 
Finally, we adopt a different approach where the two most important variables that influence 
capital flows are now compressed into one “composite” variable.
9 We do this with a principal 
component analysis, where the dimensions of the interest rate differentials and the REER 
vectors are now compressed and mapped into one dimension so as to see how the 
“fundamentals base” movement of both variables (REER and interest rate differentials) 
influences the probability of capital flows decreasing.  
Graph 13 shows a very interesting finding from this analysis. The probability that “capital 
inflows (outflows) decrease” becomes bigger (smaller) with the combination of a rise in the 
interest rate differential and REER appreciation. This suggests that, in the face of an 
increase in the interest rate differential and REER appreciation, foreign capital already in 
Indonesia will probably stay, while a decrease in capital inflows is more likely.  
                                                  
9   The term “composite” variable is actually not entirely correct by definition in our principal component analysis 
approach. However, it is meant only to simplify the interpretation of a new single vector of data which actually 
represents the fundamental dynamic factors: REER and interest rate differentials, influencing the probability 
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Foreign capital flows (to and from Indonesia) 
and their response to the composite of 
interest rate differentials and REER, 
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5. Closing  remarks 
Indonesia’s financial sector liberalisation succeeded in strengthening the capacity of the 
domestic financial system and promoting the rapid expansion of foreign capital inflows for 
financing national development. However, in the first half of the 1990s huge inflows of 
capital, much of which were short-term, led to asset price bubbles in the property sector and 
runaway credit expansion that threatened financial system stability. Indonesia became an 
easy target for speculators because of weaknesses in the financial system, poor corporate 
governance and heavy dependence on the external sector. As a result, the country was 
plunged into a prolonged crisis.  
The actions taken during the crisis and post-crisis period have brought significant results, 
although Indonesia is still some way from achieving full recovery from the crisis. 
Considerable progress has been made in stabilising macroeconomic conditions and 
resolving various structural problems. This has helped to create conditions that will enable 
Indonesia to move forward with the development process set back by the crisis. In view of 
the importance of foreign capital in accelerating economic development and having learned 
lessons on the negative impact of weak management in this area, the policy actions 
necessary for Indonesia to move forward are as follows: 
First, globalisation is an unstoppable phenomenon and Indonesia must do what is necessary 
to profit from this trend. An open economy offers a means of financing development beyond 
the capacity of domestic sources. Indonesia must thus retain the free foreign exchange 
regime and support its usefulness by building a more efficient, stronger and sounder 
domestic financial market. The monitoring of foreign exchange flows is therefore not aimed at 
imposing restrictions on capital flows. Instead, it is more for statistical purposes in support of 
monetary policy and improved transparency, one of the prerequisites for the creation of an 
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Second, the strengthening of the financial system will be crucial. Liberalisation of capital 
flows should be supported by a more robust institutional structure and regulatory framework 
in the financial system, particularly in the application of prudential principles and better risk 
management in keeping with international standards. These efforts must also be 
complemented by consistent macroeconomic policy.  
Third is the selection of an appropriate exchange rate system. The balance of payments 
crisis in Indonesia and other countries was closely linked to negative impacts from rigid 
exchange rate systems. Experience demonstrates that systems like these lead to moral 
hazard in taking on excessive, unhedged foreign borrowings. In the view of the monetary 
authority, the free floating rate system is the most appropriate for today’s conditions. Sharp 
rate fluctuations from the application of this system can be minimised through consistent 
implementation of appropriate macro and micro policies.  
Fourth, good governance  and  transparency in the private and government sectors are 
important to the development of healthy markets and strengthening of government policy 
credibility. To achieve this, at least two prerequisites need to be in place: (i) implementation 
of macroeconomic policy and financial sector regulations within a transparent framework 
supported by up-to-date, accurate and high-quality information; and (ii) the private sector 
must operate in compliance with accounting standards and uphold international standards of 
disclosure in keeping with sound business principles.  
Fifth, Indonesia must extend full support for improvements in the international financial 
architecture. To avoid future crises and cope with the impact of any crises that may arise, the 
international financial system must undergo a restructuring to ensure not only that countries 
operate sound macroeconomic policies, but also that these policies are properly coordinated. 
This is especially necessary among developed countries. The restructuring must also ensure 
that the private sector is involved in the management of capital inflows. 
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